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Abstract 
International governmental organisations (IGO) are an active presence in youth 
unemployment policy. This article undertakes a detailed analysis of the formative 
role of one IGO - the World Bank (WB) – in the framing of policy in this issue area. It 
charts the WB’s emergence as a powerful political actor in this policy field and 
identifies the ideational content of its discourses. Four principal themes are 
identified: skills deficits; the effects of employment regulation and social protection 
on youth labour markets; the ‘demographication’ of explanations for burgeoning 
youth unemployment; and connections between youth unemployment, criminal 
activity and social disorder. The discussion highlights significant evidence of neo-
liberal continuity and reinvention in WB discourses as its normative and ideational 
frameworks are extended to new terrains of analysis in ways that infer direct links 
between youth unemployment, social protection and social cohesion 
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social cohesion; social disorder. 
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1.  Introduction 
In a statement accompanying the launch of the World Bank’s (WB) 2013 flagship 
World Development Report: Jobs (World Bank, 2012a) the director of the report, 
Martin Rama, proclaimed:  
 The youth challenge alone is staggering. More than 620 million young people 
 are neither working nor studying. Just to keep employment rates constant, 
 the worldwide number of jobs will have to increase by around 600 million 
 over a 15-year period. (World Bank, 2012b) 
                                                          
1 Fergusson, R. and Yeates, N. (2013). Business, as usual: the policy priorities of the World Bank’s 
discourses on youth unemployment and the global financial crisis. Journal of International and 
Comparative Social Policy, 29, 1, 64-78 
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This statement reflects a growing volubility by the WB that there is a discernable 
‘youth’ dimension to the catastrophic impacts of the global financial crisis (GFC) on 
employment. Indeed, between 2008 and 2009, the number of unemployed young 
people increased by an unprecedented 4.5 million; by the time its effects had been 
fully felt in 2009, 81 million were recorded as being without work – more than one in 
eight of the world’s 15-24 year olds (ILO, 2010). Significant as these figures are, they 
underestimate the scale of youth unemployment because they leave out of account 
all those in that age range who are not in employment, education or training, those 
who are working in the informal economy, or who are ‘inactive’ but unrecorded (ILO, 
2010).   
Despite the fact that youth unemployment is a manifestly global issue (in its reach, 
causes and consequences) studies of youth employment have focused on national 
policies and polities and failed to notice that international organisations are 
increasingly active and influential in policy formation in this, and other, fields. Yet in 
addition to the WB, the ILO (2010, 2012), UN ECOSOC (2009, 2012), the OECD (2010) 
and the IMF (ILO-IMF 2010) have all variously pronounced on the grave social 
consequences, both actual and anticipated, of the current global crisis and its 
implications for young people.  
This article undertakes a detailed analysis of the recently unfolding norms and ideas 
concerning youth unemployment of one IGO – the World Bank. The WB has emerged 
as a powerful and influential political actor in the formation of youth employment 
policy and programmes worldwide; yet although its general social policy 
promulgations have been reasonably well documented, its policy position on youth 
unemployment has not. Using a critical discourse analysis to identify how texts can 
create, maintain or shift ideologies, this paper undertakes a detailed examination of 
key WB social policy reports that bear on issues of youth unemployment: two World 
Development Reports – one on young people (World Bank, 2006), the other on jobs 
(WB, 2012a) - and the Social Protection and Labour (SPL) strategy (WB, 2011). It 
presents a critical detailed reading of the content of these policy texts to discern the 
World Bank’s position on youth unemployment with regard to its attribution of the 
causes, consequences and preferred policy responses to youth unemployment.  
In doing so, the paper contributes to on-going efforts to track WB social policy. 
Previous analyses (Deacon, 2007, 2008, 2011; Deacon, Stubbs & Hulse, 1997; Hall, 
2007; Mehrotra & Delamonica, 2006, 2007; Merrien, 2001; Yeates, 2008) have 
emphasised the Bank as a promoter of neo-liberal, residualist social policy. They 
typically highlight a consistent policy orientation across social protection, labour, 
education, health and social services, that reflects neo-liberals' preference for 
individual responsibility, 'choice', self-interest and enforceable contractual rights 
over collective responsibility, social cohesion, integration and equity. In the words 
of Tanvir Suntasim “One is reminded repeatedly that the World Bank is a financial 
institution and not a development agency; economic returns are prioritised…” 
(Bretton Woods Project, 2010, no page number). This paper’s focus on youth 
employment tests the extent to which this approach is evident in this trans-
sectoral policy field. In addition, because the period covered (2006-2012) precedes 
 3 
and post-dates the global financial crisis, the discussion makes a contribution to 
debates about how the global financial crisis may have impacted upon the Bank’s 
policy stance in this area, and whether neoliberalism is being abandoned or 
reinvented in the wake of the crisis (Deacon, 2011; Sharpe & Watts, 2012; Utting, 
Razavi & Buchholz, 2012).  
The discussion unfolds across two subsequent principal sections. The next section 
briefly charts the emergence during the last decade of the World Bank (WB) as a 
powerful political actor in the field of youth unemployment, and discusses the 
significance of this in terms of historic struggle between neo-liberal and social 
democratic policy positions. In section 3, the discussion presents a detailed analysis 
of the ideational content of WB policy on youth (un)employment. It is organised 
around four principal themes – skills deficits; employment and social protection; the 
demographication of youth unemployment; and social cohesion and disorder. This is 
followed by a discussion which draws together some of the implications of these 
themes. Section 4, which concludes the paper, briefly recaps on key findings and 
considers their wider significance in the light of debates about the direction of WB 
social policy.  
The analysis presented in this paper finds significant evidence of neo-liberal 
continuities alongside the emergence of new themes extending the normative roots 
of those continuities, and some accompanying shifts in and adjustments to them. 
The WB’s neoliberal social policy orientation shows no signs of being dislodged; 
indeed, behind some apparent concessions to labour force development and social 
protection its recent entry into this policy field may have consolidated the 
rootedness of neo-liberalism within the Bank and beyond.   
2.  The emergence of the World Bank as a political 
actor in youth policy  
Although the World Bank is an established political actor in social protection policy 
(Deacon, 2007, 2008; Hall, 2007), its attention has turned to young people relatively 
recently. Indeed, it was not until the early 2000s that the World Bank began to 
directly engage with youth issues, since when it has emerged as a powerful presence 
in this realm of global policy making. Its entrance into this field occurred in the 
context of efforts to forge a ‘new’ development agenda, marked by the Millennium 
Development Goals, and to establish inter-institutional partnerships to progress their 
implementation. In the issue area of youth employment specifically, it was a core 
partner in a dedicated transnational policy network, the Youth Employment Network 
(YEN), established by the 2001 Oslo Millennium Summit ‘to prioritize youth 
employment on the development agenda and to exchange knowledge on effective 
policies and programmes to improve employment opportunities for youth’ (ILO/YEN 
website, no page number). Set up as an inter-institutional partnership of the UN, the 
ILO and the World Bank, supported by British and Swedish government aid, YEN ‘is a 
platform and service provider focusing on policy advice, innovative pilot projects, 
knowledge sharing and brokering partnerships’ (ILO/YEN Mission Statement).  
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Following its first substantive and extended youth-focused policy analysis in its 2007 
World Development Report (World Bank, 2006), the WB instigated the Global 
Partnership for Youth Employment in 2008 (GPYE) in which the YEN became one 
partner alongside a regional development bank, and civil society groups and a 
consultancy company. The aims of the YEN and the GPYE share much common 
ground, though the latter’s website places particular emphasis on the World Bank’s 
claims to expertise as knowledge brokers and providers of technical assistance to 
stakeholders across government and civil society. Since this time, the WB has 
consolidated its position as a key global actor in relation to youth employment, 
through the GPYE undertaking research and evaluation, offering technical advice, 
brokering policy dialogue, and developing its policy position on youth employment 
through two 2010 reports, on active labour market policies for young people (WB, 
2010a) and on job skills (WB, 2010b). This work fed into its new Social Protection and 
Labour (SPL) Strategy (WB, 2011) and its 2013 World Development Report (WB, 
2012a). 
By way of preface to our detailed analysis in Section 3 of the ideational content of 
the World Bank’s policy orientation on youth employment, we offer some brief 
observations on the significance of the World Bank’s growing ‘actorness’ in this 
policy field. First, the WB’s entry into inter-IGO partnership arrangements with the 
UN and ILO in the YEN and latterly through the GPYE mounted an unassailable and 
direct challenge to the hegemony of the UN and the ILO in this policy field. The ILO 
had dominated this field since the 1970s (Freedman, 2005); its emphasis on labour 
rights, comprehensive social protection, and more recently on ‘decent work’, was 
the prevailing global policy paradigm. 
Second, the publication of the 2007 World Development Report (WB, 2006) was 
significant beyond its specific content precisely because it was a launch pad with 
which to consolidate its position in this area over the coming years. In this case, 
then, the 2007 WDR was a decisive turn in the politics of the determination of this 
policy field. By the end of the decade, just as the political consequences of the global 
financial crisis were becoming apparent, the WB had a ‘ready-made’ policy position 
on youth employment and was leading its own global network. If the WB had moved 
from the margins of the field to occupy a lead role, so the ILO’s position had 
correspondingly moved from the lead global agency enjoying hegemonic status in 
this policy field to being one of two principal global agencies. By the end of the 
decade, the UN/ILO were incorporated as one voice amongst many in the WB’s GPYE 
network. Given the WB’s historic position on social policy, and its growing ‘actorness’ 
in the field of youth unemployment at the sub-national, national, regional and global 
levels, it is, then, vitally important to look closely at the WB’s policy priorities in its 
youth unemployment discourses if we are to grasp its distinctive contributions to 
shaping the direction of policy responses at this time and in the years to come.  
3. Critical analysis of World Bank policy discourses 
Our analysis of the WB texts is organised around four principal discursive themes. 
The first theme is the preoccupation with the (mis)match between young people's 
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skills (however defined) and the perceived skills needs of specific labour markets. 
The second theme focuses on the dynamics of labour markets, and in particular the 
dynamics of labour supply and demand, in relation to young people as these are 
realised through labour costs and wage levels, particularly concerning minimum 
wages, employment protection and social protection. To these two broadly familiar 
spheres of dominant WB discourse, two more have emerged since the unfolding of 
the global financial crisis. Our third theme, then, is the WB’s of the coincidence of 
the crisis with the so-called 'Youth Bulge' in some countries, which, we argue, 
approximates a neo-Malthusian position. The final theme takes the form of a new 
WB interest in the relationship between (un)employment and social cohesion. 
Although the WB broadly explores this across the working-age range, it includes a 
focus on criminality and civil unrest and disorder when discussed specifically in 
relation to young people. 
3.1 Unskilled youth: can mismatch be a permanent condition? 
The long history of objections from employers, employers’ organisations and 
government departments that young people’s skills are in general poor matches for 
the needs of business is well-documented, and the many highly developed rebuttals 
have done remarkably little to significantly assuage this thinking (Gleeson, 1987; 
Avis, Bloomer, Esland, Gleeson & Hodgkinson (eds), 1996; Hyland & Johnson, 1998; 
Payne, 2004; Hutton, 2005). The WB continues unabated to attribute youth 
unemployment to inadequate skills. For instance, it singles out one report which 
purports to provide evidence that managers rate skills shortages as the greatest 
constraint on business compared to all other factors by a considerable measure 
across a range of economies (World Bank, 2012a, Figure 5.13).  
Skills are broadly defined, across thinking skills, behavioural skills, specific 
knowledge, basic and post-basic skills and vocational skills (WB, 2006, p. 71). While 
an understandable preoccupation with elementary literacy and numeracy skills 
peppers the WB documents, the implicit and explicit emphasis placed on human 
capital development throughout the texts carries notions of endemic skills shortfalls 
across the range, and the need for perpetual skills updating and upscaling in pursuit 
of individual prosperity and national economic growth. Of significance for these 
purposes is the tenor of the analysis: 
 In middle-income countries with growing industrial sectors, the bridges 
 between school and work, meant to address youth’s lack of work experience 
 and severe skill mismatches, take the form of formal apprenticeships or 
 bringing work experience into the school context. (WB, 2006, p.111, emphasis 
 added) 
This captures well the insinuations of young people’s shortcomings. The explicit 
language of failure creeps into the narrative, through references to 'young people 
who failed to acquire basic skills first time around' (ibid., p. 71) and to young people 
who are 'failing to enter the labour market' (ibid., p.96). In effect, young people are 
portrayed as the authors of their own unemployed status.  
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It is important to recognise that there is some recognition of the complex interactive 
dynamic between the supply of, and demand for, skills (WB, 2012a, p.174-8), 
although the WB analysis tends to concludes with examples that demonstrate 
unequivocal supply-side deficiencies rather than poorly articulated demand. 
Elsewhere, counter-dominant examples are offered of over-skilling as a cause of 
youth unemployment. Drawing on examples from the Middle East and North Africa, 
it presents data showing that graduate unemployment exceeds unemployment 
amongst young people who sought to enter the labour market at the end of primary 
schooling, especially where there are job guarantees for employment in the public 
sector (2006, p.109 and table 4.2). Six years later, the WB cites similar examples, 
alongside others of highly educated young people from affluent families being 
amongst the most likely to experience unemployment in low-income countries (WB, 
2012c, p. 99). Elsewhere, these counter-examples are largely attributed to queuing 
for overpaid civil service jobs which have had dysfunctional effects on the 
distribution of skills in developing economies (WB, 2012a, p. 174, 176). But in neither 
case does the counter-example cited subvert the overwhelming dominance of the 
skills deficit discourse.  
Where this narrative is not directly drawn upon to explain youth unemployment, the 
underlying argument remains that inadequate skills hold back the economic growth 
generative of demand for young workers. The prevailing interpretation is nowhere 
better or more succinctly captured than in the WB’s SPL strategy document, which 
identifies three important elements for improving social protection and labour: 
 [F]irst, ensuring investing in the human capital of children; second, activating 
 individuals, especially youth, and improving the functioning of labor markets 
 to include them; and third, improving the earning opportunities of workers, 
 especially through building their skills and productivity. (WB, 2011, p. 25) 
This statement neatly reiterates the WB’s human capital framework, places the 
stress upon individual young people and the need to 'activate' them into jobs, and 
identifies skills improvement as the centrepiece of this activation. These priorities 
are unambiguous and consistent throughout these reports. Invariably, economic 
development is the most important single solution to unemployment: questions of 
the structuring and distribution of employment opportunities, and of the rights and 
entitlements of young people attempting to embark upon independent lives are out 
of the WB’s purview. 
3.2 On being careful what you wish for: adverse effects of labour and social 
protection? 
 
The theme of unemployed young people pricing themselves out of jobs is developed 
in the context of unintended consequences of labour regulations on youth labour 
markets:  
 ….some broadly based policies, especially those regulating the labor market, 
 can hurt new entrants disproportionately. For example, minimum wages are 
 sometimes set too high, and some studies in the United States and Latin 
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 America have found that they can reduce the employment of youth. 
 Employment protection laws provide stability to those already employed, but 
 could inhibit employers from taking a risk in hiring promising but 
 inexperienced workers. A study of 15 Latin American and Caribbean and 28 
 [OECD] countries found the impact of such regulations on young people’s 
 employment rates to be more than twice that on prime-age male workers. 
 (WB, 2006, p.51-2) 
The WB’s assertion that employment protection lowers employment rates (ibid., p. 
105, figure 2) and is unlikely to prove successful as a youth employment policy (ibid., 
table 4.2) is echoed in the 2013 WDR. Here, it draws on extensive data relating to 
risks poor localities face in mimicking the wage expectations of booming cities (WB, 
2012a, p. 204) and speedily qualifies narratives on the virtue of minimum wages by 
reference to their potentially exclusionary effects on young workers (and women) 
from the formal economy and the risks of rigid minimum wage legislation when 
economic circumstances deteriorate (ibid., p. 261). Where the impacts of minimum 
wage legislation are demonstrably redistributive, their uneven and potentially 
polarising effects (between beneficiaries and those who are unemployed) are 
invoked (ibid., p. 262) and consequential job losses are highlighted (ibid., p. 263).  
This message is also visible in a discussion of the dilemmas faced by formalising 
economies in which an ambition to universal social protection appears attainable. 
The trade-off, the WB argues, is to balance the improved living standards of those 
who gain protection against the costs to those who are excluded from such 
protection, especially in face of the risk that ‘formalization may reduce productivity if 
it distorts incentives or puts a burden on firms’ (WB, 2012a, p. 210). In this, it echoes 
the Social Protection and Labour strategy document’s suggestion that social 
protection schemes should continue to be extended to young people 'while keeping 
in mind capacity and resource constraints' (WB, 2011, p. 90). 
The  underlying message is clear: in some contexts, young people price themselves 
out of jobs by trying to enter labour markets in which minimum wage legislation 
makes them ‘unaffordable’ (see also 3.2 above). As if to demonstrate, the 2007 WDR 
observes that: 
 Some youth are neither working nor in school […]; other poor young people 
 cannot afford to stay unemployed, most have to work. So the incidence of 
 unemployment may be low, although youth are still mired in poverty. In the 
 poorest countries, youth unemployment rates are very low and employment 
 rates are very high (figure 4.3). As country income increases the incidence of 
 unemployment among youth also increases—a likely reflection of available 
 alternative income sources and safety nets that make it possible to be 
 unemployed. Youth employment rates also fall as per capita income increases 
 because youth devote more time to schooling. (WB, 2006, p.100) 
The graphic representation (reproduced here as Figure 1), makes startlingly clear the 
different effects across rich and poor countries. 
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Figure 1. Where young people cannot afford to be unemployed, youth 
unemployment is low and employment is high  
Source: figure 4.3, World Bank, 2006. 
 
The low levels of unemployment and high levels of employment in low income 
countries are in many respects counter-intuitive. Almost as surprising is the near-1:1 
ratio of unemployed to employed young people in high income countries. The 
steadily graded shift in the ratio of unemployed to employed between the two 
underscores the significance of socio-economic context in explaining such sharp 
differentiation. Nevertheless, it is a powerful and contentious claim to argue that 
'other poor young people cannot afford to stay employed' (idem). Its voluble 
implication is that being unemployed is a privilege of being young in a high-income 
country, and as such must be interpreted as an individual choice on the part of each 
unemployed young person. There is insufficient space here to interrogate the data 
which gives rise to Fares, Montenegro & Orazem’s (2006) findings cited by the WB in 
its 2007 WDR; suffice it to say that it gives rise to many questions about its 
definitional and categorical basis. Certainly, some interrogation of the 1:4 ratio of 
unemployed to employed in low-income countries is warranted before being led by 
the unstated implication that youth unemployment is in part a personal choice of the 
privileged rich.  
In the aftermath of the global financial crisis which has informed the more recent 
reports, it might be expected that both the ratios in Figure 1 and the differences 
between them when categorised by country income grouping would look 
significantly different. It is likely that in the highest income countries shifts in the 
ratio would make an ostensibly even stronger case for encouraging young people to 
work for lower pay in pursuit of a deflationary economic recovery. Such a debate 
would make graphically transparent the unstated normative and ideological choices 
which make dilemmas out of WB advice to countries beset by youth unemployment. 
In such circumstances, attempts to straddle the divide between the interests of 
profit for businesses and the rights of those for whom work is essential for survival 
become ever more difficult.  
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3.3  Boom, bulge or surplus: the ‘demographication’ of youth unemployment  
 
One consistent element of the WB’s analysis of youth unemployment across all the 
reports is the so-called 'youth bulge’:  
 Today, 1.5 billion people are ages 12–24 worldwide, 1.3 billion of them in 
 developing countries, the most ever in history. This number will rise but not by 
 much more, because it is fast approaching a plateau as fertility rates decline, 
 producing a “bulge” in the world’s population structure. (WB, 2006, p.4) 
The report picks up this theme in its detailed analysis: 
 In 32 developing and transition countries, a 10 percent increase in the youth 
 share of the population increased youth unemployment by an estimated 6 
 percent between 1980 and 2000. (ibid., p.104) 
The theme continues in the 2013 WDR report: 
 Many countries with youth unemployment problems have very large youth 
 cohorts… The Middle East and North Africa, which has especially high youth 
 unemployment, is an overwhelmingly young region. More than 100 million 
 people between the ages of 15 and 29, making up 30% of the region's 
 population and about 47% of the working age population. Youth cohorts this 
 large are not only likely to face higher unemployment rates but also tend to 
 exert downward pressure on labour earnings. (WB, 2012a, p. 207) 
This theme is revisited in a number of different country contexts in all three reports. 
Demographic fluctuations occur across the full range of country categories 
irrespective of development and national prosperity. In the context of most of 
Europe and North America, the post-war baby boom is seen, in retrospect, as an 
economic asset, associated with growth, technological advancement, cultural 
development and generally increased living standards. The shift from the discourse 
of ‘baby boom’ to the terminology of 'youth bulge' reframes this demographic trend 
not just as a labour market issue but as an issue of oversupply. The logic of all three 
reports is to try to avert ever-increasing youth unemployment by treating these 
enlarged populations as opportunities to re-steer economic fortunes. By juxtaposing 
two problems the notional win-win solution reveals itself, as follows: 
● In some countries, large cohorts of new entrants and higher female 
 participation rates will continue to add pressure on the youth labour market. 
● Poor access to information and credit leads to premature exit from school, 
 perpetuating skill mismatches. (WB, 2006, p.103) 
Schooling the excessive supply of labour promises to alleviate rising unemployment 
and to prepare young people for a more skilled and developed economy by 
extending their education. But of course, the pressures upon young people to begin 
their economic contribution to their birth family by seeking poverty-wage jobs of the 
kind identified above militates against this solution. And by the same token, schools 
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are repeatedly referred to as failing – whether by virtue of their emphasis on rote 
learning (WB, 2006, p. 19), or because of curricula that failed to engage, instruct and 
teach work-related skills (ibid., p. 39), or because of generally low levels of learning 
achievement (ibid, p. 69-70). An obverse reading of the same circumstances 
interprets this strategy as an attempt to solve unemployment problems by keeping 
surplus labour off the labour market; and as an exercise in blaming the education 
system for failing to make this either an attractive proposition for pupils for a 
tangible benefit in the shape of meeting the ill-defined skills needs of a low-skill 
economy. Even in the most advanced economies, the limited successes of expecting 
the education system to warehouse the surplus labour of economies in recession has 
long been identified as a poor and sometimes cynical strategy (Roberts, 1997; 
Gleeson & Shain, 1999)  
At root, though, the youth bulge is construed as problematic not primarily because 
of the failures of schools or of apparently-finite labour markets but because of those 
who created the boom. In its enthusiastic pursuit of responsible parents, the 2007 
WDR lets slip the following normative Western nuclear family behavioural 
proprieties:  
 [Adults] also need to be adequately prepared to become parents to reduce 
 the intergenerational transmission of poverty that occurs because of the 
 failure to plan and space births, and nurture children appropriately. (WB, 
 2006, p.40, emphasis added) 
In a phrase, the report momentarily lifts the veil which reveals that behind the quasi-
-benign terminology of the 'youth bulge' lurks a neo-Malthusian discourse of over-
fecund foreigners whose problems would be solved by some simple technologies of 
population control and management. Seen in these lights, the massive problems of 
youth unemployment, poor job opportunities and the oversupply of labour are in 
part sui-generis.  
3.4  Social cohesion: constructing virtuous circles from the vices of the poor? 
The concept of social cohesion is a recent and significant innovation of WB 
discourses on youth unemployment. The WDR 2013 dedicates an entire chapter to 
the subject of jobs and social cohesion, beginning with the summary claim that: 
 Jobs can shape social interactions and the ways societies manage collective 
 decision-making. They connect people with others and can provide access to 
 voice. (WB, 2012a, p. 127) 
Chapter sections are variously tagged with such optimistic (and occasionally banal) 
headings as: ‘Jobs can manage social tensions’, ‘Jobs (or the lack of jobs) can shape 
social interactions’, ‘Jobs provide social identity’, and ‘Jobs connect people’. The 
chapter presents copious evidence of correlations between employment, trust, and 
civic engagement, while recognising the difficulties of adducing causal relations from 
such patterns of connection. The SPL strategy report similarly endorses this 
approach: 
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 SPL is increasingly recognized as a vehicle for ensuring social stability and 
 implementing social contracts to ensure that rights and state obligations are 
 fulfilled and social cohesion strengthened as recognized in the prominent 
 One-UN Social Protection Floor initiative. SPL can be an important element in 
 ensuring social cohesion during periods of rapid structural change (driven, for 
 example, by demographics or migration) and in the face of crises (WB, 2011, 
 p. 2; emphasis added) 
Perhaps the most significant aspect this new departure is the prominence it affords 
to the social and other non-economic benefits of work and employment, and its 
obverse recognition that crises like the GFC have adverse consequences far beyond 
the economic privations they visit on people living in poverty. But the benefits 
ascribed to being in a job are not allowed to stand entirely on their intrinsic merits as 
social gains, quality-of-life and personal satisfactions. Economic benefits are inferred 
both from well-being effects, from the amelioration of weakening bonds of social 
cohesion and rising tides of inter-personal and inter-group conflict, and, most 
notably for our purposes, from the minimisation of a range of more extreme legally 
sanctioned and normatively rejected conducts and events that the WB’s analysis 
associates with unemployment. In particular, much of the discussion turns on the 
claimed crime-reducing effects of reduced levels of unemployment, particularly 
amongst young people, and the associated prevention of civil instability, unrest, 
disorder and violence – all of which have calculable economic costs. 
At a number of junctures, the connection between unemployment and criminal 
behaviour amongst young people is described in the following terms: 
 In extreme cases, if people, particularly youth, lack jobs and hope for the 
 future, they may turn to violent or criminal activity to compensate for the 
 absence of self-esteem and sense of belonging that job might otherwise 
 provide. (WB, 2012a, p.126) 
While much of the evidence presented to support this claim relates to zones affected 
by armed conflict, links between unemployment, gangs, drug use and firearms are 
also cited to support this connection. Drawing on case studies from Ecuador, Chicago 
and New York, the report concludes that: 
 In extreme cases, unemployment can contribute to violence or social unrest. 
 Youth in particular may turn to gangs or other violent groups to compensate 
 for the lack of ties in economic and social life. (WB, 2012a, p.132) 
Complementing this evidence, training provision for young unemployed people is 
found to reduce involvement in gangs associated with violence and criminal activity 
(WB, 2012a, pp.142-3; 171; 195).  
Whatever the causes of the success of such locally specific examples, this line of 
analysis takes no account of the extensive and highly contested literature often 
referred to as the 'economic causes of crime' thesis. It selectively cites one of the 
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very few directly relevant studies whose findings unequivocally support the 
proposition that there is a causal connection between youth unemployment and 
rising crime (Fougere, Kramarz & Pouget, 2009) while overlooking the many others 
that point to the contrary. On this latter point, the current conjuncture in the UK 
alone gives serious grounds to doubt the association: in a period of high youth 
unemployment, and despite considerable difficulties in the isolation of secure data, 
there are strong indications that the incidence of crime on the part of young people 
has decreased (Fergusson, 2013). It is by no means clear that poverty and property-
related crime amongst young people are associated in any consistent way. The 
inclusion of gangs in the chain of connection between unemployment and criminality 
is particularly insidious. It draws heavily upon a particular discourse of 
idle/troubled/drug-using/aggressive/violent youth which is highly contested in the 
research literature. The few serious studies undertaken have found difficulty in 
evidencing any clear connection (Goldson (ed), 2011; Muncie, 2009; Lewis, Newburn, 
Taylor, McGillivray, Greenhill, Frayman & Proctor, 2011).   
The WB makes similar connections between high levels of youth unemployment and 
civil unrest and violence. The apparent associations between youth unemployment 
and the events of the Tunisian demonstrations, the ‘Arab Spring’ more generally and 
the English riots of 2011 are variously cited to suggest that:  
 Having, or not having, a job can shape how people view themselves and 
 relate to others. While some jobs can be empowering, in extreme cases a lack 
 of job opportunities can contribute to violence or social unrest. (WB, 2012a, 
 p.12) 
And that: 
 Frustration and even social unrest may develop when education and effort 
 are not rewarded or when people perceive the distribution of jobs to be unfair 
 (ibid., p.127) 
In a slightly more reflective vein, the narrative continues: 
 The Arab Spring was as much or more about political voice as it was about 
 jobs. Yet widespread disappointment, especially among youth, about the lack 
 of job opportunities and frustration with the allocation of jobs based on 
 connections rather than merit echoed across countries. (ibid, p.137) 
This tentativeness grins through the text at a number of points. Notwithstanding, the 
World Bank's account of civil unrest amongst young people since the GFC is 
unequivocally blind to other interpretations that regard many instances as legitimate 
expressions of exactly the kinds of frustration quoted above. The WDR makes no 
reference to the much more explicitly articulated protest movements on the part of 
unemployed young people in Greece and Spain (Jawad, 2012; Papadopoulos & 
Roumpakis, 2012). In this, the WB's analysis stands apart from that of the ILO, which 
cautiously and discriminatingly interpreted demonstrations on the part of young 
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people across nearly 90 countries as warranted expressions of extreme frustration 
and resentment at being made victims of the foibles and abuses of international 
financiers (Somavia/ILO, 2012a, 2012b). 
3.5  Defective youth or demand deficiency? The discursive tactics of deflection 
and distraction 
This section began by emphasising the universal focus of these WB reports on 
human capital deficiencies, on adverse effects of robust employment regulation on 
the functioning of labour markets, on the necessity of activation initiatives directed 
towards young people for improving the functioning of labour markets, and on the 
centrality of the employability and skills-upgrading measures to such activation 
processes. Such parameters eclipse questions of demand deficiency, the structuring 
of labour markets, the distribution of employment opportunities and young people's 
rights and entitlements.  
In addition, this reading of the WB’s analysis of forms of employee protection based 
on minimum wages, employment rights and social protection drew attention to its 
construction of these provisions socially divisive - between the interests of those 
young people who gain access to oversubscribed labour markets and those who are 
excluded from them. It is strongly implied that the successful demands of young 
people (or of those who act collectively on their behalf) for wages that maintain 
them barely above poverty levels or compensate them for redundancy are significant 
elements in market closure, and significant determinants of levels of unemployment 
amongst their peers – primarily because of the cost burdens they placed upon 
employers. The emphasis of the WB’s analyses falls upon striking an entirely 
unspecified balance in these supposedly opposing interests, and excludes 
considerations of basic rights and entitlements that deserve parity with or 
precedence over firms' maintenance of profit margins and shareholder dividends. 
The points noted earlier that the poor of low income countries have no option to be 
unemployed while the wealthy of high income countries can choose to be 
unemployed or in work also supports arguments in favour of wage deflation in times 
of economic duress. The accounts and analyses are constructed as though these 
were necessities of economic 'laws', not matters for debate and fundamental 
products of social priorities and values. The needs of business eclipse any such 
considerations. 
Seen in this light, the WB's desire to bolster evidence in support of the case for social 
cohesion appears to be notably benign. Its venture into the ‘soft’ world of social 
cohesion could be interpreted as constituting a small gesture towards the idea of the 
‘social investment state’, which seeks to justify pro-welfarist social policy 
interventions in terms of their measurable productivity paybacks; or as an effort to 
broaden the WB’s historically narrow economy-focused pro-business horizons. 
Nevertheless, this new discursive trajectory has a disturbing tendency to align itself 
with some of the classic discourses which variously view 'the unemployed' as 
feckless, indolent and prone to criminal and violent acts. It has some alarmingly 
resonant echoes of the 'problem poor' as morally deficient. Criticism of the too-
fecund populations unable to properly plan and manage their fertility and their 
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children’s entry into labour markets also casts new light on the WB’s ‘youth bulge’ 
analysis, which was offered in contradistinction to the positive attributes of a ‘baby 
boom’ in advanced economies. 
Taken element by element, these analyses are underpinned by some evidential 
foundation powered by a good deal of accompanying discursive momentum. Taken 
together, they coagulate to portray unemployment as a condition resulting from 
personal deficits and deficiencies and as a product of overregulated, oversubscribed 
labour markets in which too many young people bring their ill-matched and poorly 
developed skills to market too early. Young people (and often their parents) attract a 
series of descriptors and analyses that portray them as a kind of underclass. Not only 
are they too populous, poorly educated and prone to swamping stressed labour 
markets prematurely; their consequential mass unemployment turns many of them 
to the company of gangs, to the comforts of drugs, to the protection of arms, to 
acquisitive and violent crime, or to follow the crowd mindlessly into riotous civil 
disorder disguised as social protest. 
The composite cluster, assembled as a holistic analysis, feed alarmingly into a corpus 
of much more widely deployed but ultimately discredited discourses of the failings, 
pathologies and defects of this underclass. The cumulative effect of these layered 
renditions of youth unemployment is to hold attention on the supply side of labour 
market failures; they divert attention from one of the fundamental explanations of 
mass, burgeoning endemic youth unemployment: deficiency of aggregate demand 
for labour. The rationale underpinning the short-lived neo-Keynesian revival during 
the earliest and most alarming stages of the GFC (see Harvey, 2011; Peck, Theodore 
& Brenner, 2012), which identified public investment and major stimulus packages as 
the key remedial measures to stem the head-long plunge towards depression, is 
absent from these WB reports. Most remarkable of all is that the concept of demand 
deficiency in labour markets is almost completely absent from these reports. It 
receives rare passing mention and is substantively deployed only once, for the 
specific purpose of criticising closed professional labour markets and graduate 
queues in Muslim-dominated economic cultures that puts traditions of lineage and 
qualified succession above open competition and the pursuit of entrepreneurialism. 
In effect, this suite of analyses almost entirely ignores what is to many economists 
the dominant theory for explaining mass unemployment.  
4. Conclusion 
This paper has presented the first detailed textual analysis of WB policy discourses of 
youth unemployment. Focusing on the normative underpinnings and ideational 
content of WB key policy texts spanning 2006-2012, the discussion has been 
concerned with identifying the WB’s attribution of the causes, consequences and 
appropriate policy responses to youth unemployment. On this basis, we are led to 
the conclusion that, despite the global financial crisis and booming global levels of 
youth unemployment, it is ‘business as usual’ at the WB: on this policy issue, the WB 
is deeply committed to a policy agenda that allies neo-liberal economism with social 
conservatism. In this its policy orientation is consistent with that identified in 
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relation other issues and sectors that have been the subject of independent critical 
analysis. The WB’s analysis of the causes of youth unemployment refutes demand 
deficiency and structural analyses of youth unemployment in favour of supply side 
and individualistic factors: personal choices and conduct, skills mismatches and 
deficits, over-regulated labour markets, and poorly designed employment and social 
protection programmes.  
While supply-side explanations of mass youth unemployment have remained 
broadly constant during this period, new themes have emerged which extend the 
normative roots of those explanations. Building on the 2007 WDR’s discourses that 
have neo-Malthusian echoes, the 2013 WDR invokes demographic explanations of 
youth unemployment in its ‘youth bulge’ analysis while also placing great emphasis 
on behaviourist explanations of youth unemployment. Particularly notable in this 
regard is its invocation of underclass-style arguments in what is purported to be a 
direct relationship between unemployment, anti-social conduct, inter-personal 
violence, criminality and civil disorder. To be clear: the issue here is the failure of the 
WB to engage sufficiently with serious social science and to be seduced instead by 
popular discourses and discredited theories. Its ignorance of a body of evidence that 
consistently refutes the simplistic and inaccurate rendition of the relationship 
between these phenomena demeans its standing and credibility as a credible 
knowledge broker and a leading authority on research and evaluation.  
On the question of whether the global financial crisis has prompted a policy shift, 
even a paradigm change, in political values and policy priorities, the debate to date 
has tended to revolve around whether neoliberalism is being abandoned or 
reinvented. With the WB being variously celebrated and criticised alike for its 
infusion of neoliberal values, policies and practices throughout its social policy, 
youth unemployment policy provides an important test of whether historic struggles 
against neoliberalism have taken hold. What few studies as exist on this to date have 
been tentative. Deacon (2011) queried whether the WB’s formal participation in the 
UN global social protection floor initiative and its recognition of (some) of the 
limitations of welfare privatism might signal a possible reining in of the more 
extreme pronouncements of the WB and even indicate a new direction in social 
policy. However, this research finds nothing to support this reading.  
More than this, though, it is not just that the WB’s social policy orientation shows no 
signs of being dislodged or weakened; rather, it has been consolidated and extended 
over the period. We do not deny the possibility that this doctrine may be the subject 
of critical reflection and struggle within the WB, as Deacon (2007) suggests it is, but 
further research would be needed to ascertain the extent to which this is played out 
in the context of the internal dynamics within the WB during its formulation of its 
youth unemployment policy position. For the time being, we reiterate that 
neoliberalism at the WB is being consolidated and reinvented. That the near collapse 
of the global financial system and the consequent substantial weakening of youth 
labour markets worldwide did not dissuade the WB from this path is unremarkable if 
disappointing, while bank balance sheets recover at an infinitely more rapid pace 
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than those of the governments that underwrote them. The WB’s priorities remain 
unassailably those of business – as usual.  
On a final note, the point that an ideational project, hybridised and incomplete as it 
is, has capitalised on crisis conditions to refresh and extend its objectives does not 
signify the ‘death’ of alter-ideational, counter-offensive projects. These, too, have 
continued, and become resurgent in recent years. The historic struggles between 
neoliberal and social democratic (and other) approaches to youth unemployment, 
alongside other issues, will continue to be fought in the numerous spaces in and 
around the multiform structures of global governance and social policy. It is, indeed, 
business as usual, in more senses than one.  
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